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LIABILITY OF THE TRUST ESTATE ARISING OUT OF
TRUSTEE'S CONTRACTS WITH THIRD PERSONS
By RuBin TEPPER
I. Introduction
In the course of administration of a trust, obligations may be incurred
to third persons. These obligations may arise as a result of the ownership
of the property held in trust, out of torts committed by the trustee or his
servants, or out of contracts made by the trustee. The scope of this article
will be limited to a consideration of the latter, and more specifically to the
rights and remedies, legal and equitable, of the person to whom a liability is
thus incurred.1
Where a trust fund is used to carry on a business, or there is trust prop-
erty being managed and maintained by a trustee, there are three sources from
wbich a contract creditor might satisfy his claim: (1) trustee's individual
property; (2) the trust estate, and (3) the cestui's individual property under
the trust or outside the trust. The questions immediately arise: to what extent
is the trustee personally liable; can the trust estate be reached; how far may
he beneficiaries be personally liable?
A general rule' in the law of trusts is that a trustee is a principal and
not an agent for the cestui que trust.3 As to the latter, in California and many
other jurisdictions, where there has been no actual or potential reservation to
them of various powers of control over the trustees, no direct personal
liability can be imposed on them.4 This leaves us with the problem as to the
liability of the trustee and the trust estate.
IH. Personal Liability of Trustee
The weight of authority is that the trustee becomes personally liable on
the contract, notwithstanding it being an entirely proper contract, and entered
into for the benefit of the trust estate.5 It is immaterial that the third person
'It is believed that such analysis, though necessarily narrowed because of the practical problems
of research and analytical treatment in a field offering almost unlimited case and text material, will
still serve to embrace the problems of liability in the broader aspects, at least insofar as the same
theories apply to creditors' remedies. For the same reason, there is no attempt at an exhaustive
citation of authorities, but only enough to provide points of departure for those who wish to delve
further into the matters raised.
'See comment note, 139 A. L. R. 127, 134, that although usually stated as a rule of law,
the whole matter of rights of parties is basically one of reasonable construction of the particular
contracts.
"Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330, 28 L. Ed. 163; Everett v. Drew, 129 Mass. 150.
'Betts v. Hackathorn (Ark. 1923), 252 S. W. 602; Goldwater v. Oltman (1930), 210 Cal. 408,
292 P. 624; Rest., Trusts, sec. 274. Cf., Hardoon v. Belilios (1901), A. C. 118.
8Duvall v. Craig (1817), 2 Wheat. 45, 4 L. Ed. 180; Taylor v. Davis, supra; Cullinan v. Mercan-
tile Trust Co. (1926), 80 CaLApp. 377,252 P. 647.
(53)
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knew the trust existed or that the trustee was acting in a representative
capacity.6 The mere fact that the trustee signed the contract in his repre-
sentative capacity is ordinarily held not of itself sufficient to relieve him of
personal liability. This common-law view is succinctly stated in a leading
case, Taylor v. Davis,' where the court said:
"A trustee is not an agent. An agent represents and acts for his principal
who may be either a natural or artificial person. When an agent contracts
in the name of his principal, the principal contracts and is bound, but the
agent is not. When a trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no one is
bound, for he has no principal. The trust estate cannot promise, the contract
is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee ... "
The court then goes on to say (again in accord with the general rule
modified) :
"If a trustee contracting for the benefit of a trust wants to protect himself
from individual liability on the contract, he must stipulate that he is not to be
. . . responsible, but that the other party is to look solely to the trust estate."
In the earlier law, there was no doubt that the obligations so incurred
were regarded as resting solely upon the trustee personally. The fact that
he was trustee and not the beneficial owner was regarded as irrelevant so
far as his relations with third persons were concerned. In matters of "external"
administration of the trust, the trustee was regarded the owner, and as to
contracts made by the trustee, he and he alone was responsible for their
performance, although they were made for the benefit of the trust estate.8
Thus, the Restatement of Trusts, section 261:
"The trustee is subject to personal liability to third persons on obliga-
tions incurred in the administration of the trust to the same extent that he
would be liable if he held the property free of the trust."
And in the following sections9 the trustee's personal liability is spelled
out, with the aforementioned exception where, by the contract, it is provided
that he shall not be personally liable.
The courts of law recognized the trustee only as an individual, and did
not regard him as a juristic person in his representative capacity. Conse-
quently, contract creditors could sue the trustee in an action at law, obtain
judgment against him personally, and levy on his individual property; but
they could not, any more than an individual creditor of the trustee, levy on
the trust estate.'0 An action at law could not be maintained against the
'Scott, Trusts, sec. 262.
'See note 3, supra; also, Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, sees. 302, 712.
8Scott, Trusts, see. 261
'Rest., Trusts, sees. 262, 263.
"Scott, Trusts, p. 1472.
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trustee in his representative capacity. If the trust property were levied upon,
it was necessary to invoke the aid of equity to restrain the sheriff and the
judgment creditor from proceeding with the judgment sale. Equity would
be here acting to protect the interests of the cestui que trust, because only in
equity was the trust recognized as such. Also left to the courts of equity was
the question whether the trustee's liability was permanent or was ultimately
to be shifted to the trust.
As a result of statutory law, in a few states1' a contract creditor may
sue the trustee in his representative capacity in an action at law and collect
his judgment from the trust estate. The existence of a statute, however,
authorizing an action at law against the trust estate has been held not to
exclude personal liability of the trustee,1" an example of the general reluc-
tance of courts of law in recognizing the trust estate as a legal entity.
I. Exclusion of Personal Liability
A. IN GENERAL
If the trustee is unwilling to make himself personally liable upon a
contract made by him in the administration of the trust, he may contract
in such a way as to exclude personal liability.
" (a)
This view was not accepted at once, nor by all jurisdictions. For instance,
even as late as 1911, English courts'" seem to hold for personal liability in
spite of an express exclusionary provision in the contract, on the ground that
the provision was repugnant to the promise, and that if the trustee were not
liable the contract would be illusory. The Taylor case, supra, also deemed
the contract the personal undertaking of the trustee, for "unless he is bound,
no one is bound, for he has no principal." However, this is a complete non
sequitur, for as we shall see, when such a 'contract is made it is iniplied that
the trust estate will be liable, and the third person can enforce the contract
by a proceeding in equity to reach the trust estate. It does not follow that
merely because the trustee is not personally liable the third person has no
enforceable claim. In fact, later cases indicate the English courts now
recognize this,' 4 and numerous American cases also hold the trustee may
"Conn. Gen. St. 1930, sec. 5640; Ga. Code 1933, sees. 108-406; Pa. 20 P. S., sec. 1171.
"Larson v. Sylvester, 282 Mass. 352, 359, 185 N. E. 44; Tebaldi Supply Co., Inc. v. MacMillan,
292 Mass. 384, 198 N. E. 651.
"'(')In all these cases, it is assumed that the contracts are properly made under a power existing
in the trustee. Where the trustee acts beyond his powers, and excludes personal liability, the obligee
who contracted without knowledge of the ultra vires character of the contract may be limited to
an action for breach of implied warranty of authority to make the contract, or to quasi-contractual
relief. See 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, sees. 724,725.
"'Watling v. Lewis (1911), 1 Ch. 414.
"'In re Robinson's Settlement (1912), 1 Ch. 717,728.
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so contract as to relieve himself of personal liability. In the leading case of
Jessup v. Smith, 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 (1918), the plaintiff, having
been retained by the trustee who was unable to pay the fees of counsel, agreed
to render professional services and look to the estate for payment. The trial
court held the services were beneficial to the trustee personally, and not to
the estate. This was affirmed at the Appellate Division on the ground that the
contract bound the client, Smith, personally, but the Court of Appeals
reversed, J. Cardozo stating that the services were beneficial to the trust,
and the trustee, in such circumstances, "has the power, if other funds fail,
to create a charge, equivalent to his own lien for reimbursement, in favor
of another by whom the services were rendered," and the plaintiff could
maintain a suit against the trustee in his representative capacity. This precise
issue was admitted by the Taylor case, supra, the court apparently not being
aware of the contradiction existing between that point and the foregoing
conclusion that no one would be bound if the trustee were not.
A great deal of case law in this matter has grown up around the difficult
question as to whether a provision in the contract is so worded as to be suffi-
cient to relieve the trustee of personal liability. Some courts have insisted
upon a strict application of the rule, and refused to excuse the trustee unless
the parties contracted expressly to exempt the trustee. They would follow
the rule only when the trustee signed "as trustee but not individually," or
where the third person expressly agreed to look to the trust estate only.
Thus, even where the contract was signed in such a way as to indicate it was
made for the benefit of the trust estate, as where the trustee added "trustee"
or "as trustee" to his signature or his name in the body of the instrument,
many cases [excluding those involving negotiable instruments (see below)]
have held those words were merely descriptio personae, and hence, "surplus-
age" in spite of the fact that a reasonable interpretation of the terms
would lead the ordinary intelligent businessman to suppose the parties plainly
understood trustee was not to be personally liable. 5 Those cases have treated
the situation as though there were a clear and rigid rule of law. Yet, by
the better view, if in any manner it appears from the contract, construed in
the light of the attending circumstances, personal liability was not intended,
a contrary conclusion should be, and has been, reached.
The idea of endowing a person or group of persons with plural legal
personalities is not new to the law. Yet according to the traditional view, the
trustee as trustee was in no sense a different person from the trustee as an
"5See Prof. Warren's critical comments in his book, "Corporate Advantages Without Incorpora-
tion" (1929), p. 861; also, Scott, Trusts, sec. 263; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 731; 138
A. L. R. 155.
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individual.sa' It was true that at common law an executor might be subject
to liability in his capacity as executor, and it was possible to obtain a judgment
against him de bonis testatoris. The executor was regarded as "continuing"
the personality of the testator, and claims against the testator could be
enforced in an action against the executor in his representative capacity. But
even in the case of an executor, a suit against him in his representative
capacity would not lie on obligations incurred by him after the death of the
testator."8 Similarly in the case of a trustee, no action at law could lie
against him in his representative capacity. Thus, there was an insuperable
difficulty in reaching the trust property through an action at law.
The true distinction, however, between an action against the trustee
personally and one against him "as trustee" seems to be that the former is
an action to charge the person who is trustee, while the latter is really a suit
to reach the trust property, and is in no other sense a proceeding against the
trustee at all. (a)
According to the "fiction" or "concession" theory of a juristic person-
which derived from the Roman and civil law, and has been incorporated into
Anglo-American jurisprudence-the artificial person was created by the law
and placed in the category of natural persons, with the intention of provid-
ing an easy and convenient arrangement of certain common commercial
interests, but subject to certain legal consequences in order to protect public
and private interests.
"Men are social beings in the sense that no undertaking can be carried
out to any large extent without some kind of social cooperation. The con-
ditions of such cooperation may have to be settled at law.'
7
Thus we witness the development of the separate corporate entity doc-
trine, as aggregates of capital became more and more necessary in economic
enterprise. With the decline of individualism, new concepts such as "char-
acter" and "motive" came to be attributed to the separate legal entity, and
a school adopting a theory of realism developed. This theory treated the
juristic entity as something akin to a human personality, in addition to and
distinct from the separate will and character of the individuals who consti-
tuted the physical basis of the corporate entity. " Whichever theory of
juristic personality prevails today, we may nevertheless conclude that the
"(a)Scott, Trusts, sec. 266; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 712.
"0Scott, Trusts, sec. 266.
1(f()139 A. L. R. 127.
"Vinogradoff, "Juridical Persons," 24 Columb. L. Rev. 594.
"8Dewey, "Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personalities," 35 Yale L. J. 655; but cf.
the enemy alien corporation cases and one-man corporation cases, where the law, as it were, goes
behind the pure abstraction of the artificial entity.
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common law doctrine of no dual legal personality in the trustee has lost its
force."9
In addition to recent decisions in law, the courts of equity long gave
recognition to the trustee in his representative capacity, and to the beneficial
interests created in the cestui que trust. Contract creditors could maintain
a suit in equity to reach the trust estate, subject to certain qualifications dis-
cussed below.
B. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The adoption of section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law2" illus-
trates an effort to apply the idea of a dual legal personality to negotiable
instruments. It embraces the business concept of the trustee as representative
of the estate and as not liable personally for the trust obligation.2' In Cali-
fornia, that section has been expressly held applicable to business trusts.22
However, even under the provisions of section 20, supra, some cases have
held the trustee personally liable upon a negotiable instrument, in spite
of signatures indicating he signed in a representative capacity. Other more
liberal courts have permitted oral evidence to prove the payee was not to
hold the trustee personally.
In several states, by statute,23 an action at law can be maintained against
a trustee in his representative capacity, and judgment can be rendered against
him in that capacity, enforceable only out of the trust estate. It should be
noted, however, that this procedure is followed only where the trustee con-
tracted in the proper administration of the trust.
The Uniform Trusts Act, proposed by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, also permits an action at law against the
trustee in his representative capacity, provided the beneficiaries are given
"9Compare the statement by Justice Hand in a New York case: "Under the law of New York,
no action may be maintained against a trustee as such, any more than against a director, a freight
agent, a lawyer, a jockey, as such; the law of that state does not apparently recognize multiple
personalities," Vass v. Conron Bros., 59 F. 2d 969, 970 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) with Matter of Rausch
(1932), 258 N. Y. 327, 331, 179 N. E. 755, 756, where J. Cardozo observed "in the view of the
law, a corporation as an individual and a corporation as a trustee are two different and separate
personalities."
"'California Civil Code, sec. 3101: "Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his
signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative
capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized. ... See also Hibbs v.
Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108 (1907), 42 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 1007 (1929).
"Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (5th ed., 1932), 272, 273: "The framers of the act,
having added 'or in a representative capacity', must have intended the section to apply to trust
situations as well as to ordinary agency relationships."
"Chas. Nelson v. Morton (1930), 106 Cal. App. 144, 288 P. 845; 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,
n. 13, sec. 308, p. 990.
"See note 11, supra; also N. D. L. Rev. Code. 1943, sec. 59-0213; 60 Okla. St. Ann., sec. 174;
20 P. S. Pa. 1171; R. I. Gen. L. 1938, c. 529, sec. 1.
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an opportunity to intervene. Section 12(3) of the Uniform Trusts Act
allows a creditor to hold the trustee personally liable if the contract doesn't
exclude personal liability, but the addition of the word "trustee" or the
phrase "as trustee" is deemed prima facie evidence of an intent to exclude
the trustee from personal liability. The Uniform Trusts Act has been adopted
in six states.2 4
An interesting problem is created by section 2267 of the ,California
Civil Code. It provides:
"A trustee is a general agent for the trust property. His authority is such
as is conferred upon him by the declaration of trust and by this chapter,
and none other. His acts, within the scope of his authority, bind the trust
property to the same extent as the acts of an agent bind his principal."
Does this mean that the common law rule of personal liability unless
stipulations are made exempting such liability, is abrogated in California?
If the trustee is an agent, this is implied. Taylor v. Davis, supra, stated the
rule that the trustee is not an agent, and this language has been cited with
approval in California despite section 2267.25
The California Annotations to section 261, Restatement of Trusts, point
out that no decisions construing the provisions of section 2267 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code materially vary the principles of personal liability. It is
there noted that the language of the section is literally that of the 1865 Field
Committee draft of the proposed Civil Code for New York, and that it could
not have been the intention of the committee to introduce the concept of the
trustee as "agent" since it was not apparent from their notes. However,
although some California decisions" appear to adhere to the common law
doctrine, the conflict with section 2267 is not alluded to in the cases. In fact,
one such case, Goldwater v. Oltman, a Massachusetts trust case, recognized
that an agreement against personal liability might be implied and need not
be expressed.
In Purdy v. Bank of America Nat'l T. & S. Assn. (1935), 2 Cal. 2d 298,
40 P. 2d 481, an action by trust beneficiary against the bank for the amount
of deposit credited by defendant's predecessor bank on a trustee's note for
money borrowed, the bank was held justified in appropriating the deposit,
under a proper exercise of a banker's lien, and under section 2267, the
"La., Nev., N. C., Okla., S. D., Tex.
"The then Dean Harlan F. Stone, discussing the attitude of the courts on this issue, criticizes
the use of the word "agent" (among other terms) where that "agent" has no principal who may be
legally obligated for his acts, as an anomalous and only superficially appropriate use of the term.
Stone, "A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts of the Trustee,"
22 Columb. L. Rev. 527 (1922) ; Scott, Trusts, pp. 1540-41.
"Goldwater v. Oltman, supra; Andrews v. Horton (1935), 8 Cal. App. 2d 40, 47 P. 2d 456;
Zimmer Constr. Co. v. White (1935), 8 Cal. App. 2d 672,47 P. 2d 1087.
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trustee as agent, had the right to incur the debt represented by the overdraft
and to make the notes covering them. The note writer in 23 California Law
Review 538, comments on the principal case as of significance because it is
the first California case squarely holding that under section 2267 the contracts
of a trustee, acting within the scope of his authority, create a direct obliga-
tion upon the trust estate, thus rendering inapplicable the common law rule
that unless they contain an express provision to the contrary, the contracts of
a trustee are his personal obligation and do not bind the trust estate. The
writer adds: "Conversely, it would seem that section 2267 should operate
to relieve the trustee of personal liability, although this question is not
decided by the . . . case." But this is the very question involved. If trust
estate liability is recognized, is the trustee free from personal liability?
The lower court in the Purdy case,27 in considering section 2267, said:
"The section is a mere statutory statement of an equitable principle." The
upper court, although reversing on the issue whether implied authority
existed to bind the trust estate, did no more than establish that the trust prop-
erty might be reached without a suit in equity, the creditor having a direct
claim where the liability was properly incurred by the trustee, and without
regard to the trustee's personal liability, or to the state of the trustee's
accounts with the trust estate.
A recent Montana case, Tuttle v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (1941),
119 P. 2d 884, 139 A. L. R. 129, is appropriately discussed at this point,
since it was decided partly on a statute which was copied from the Field
Code in California.2" In that case, the defendant was sued personally and
not as trustee, although the action purported to be upon a contract made or
ratified by defendant within its powers as a testamentary trustee. The
plaintiff contended that unless in the contract a trustee specifically limits
his liability to the extent of the trust estate, the trustee becomes personally
liable thereon. The court, in sustaining defendant's demurrer for failure to
state a cause of action against defendant personally, said:
"[Although] ordinarily one does not perform an act both as an agent
and as principal29 ...the meaning of [Sec. 2267] seems clear enough. Its
effect must be either that the trust estate is to be considered an entity
chargeable as a principal for the acts of the trustee, its agent, or that the legal
incidents of the trustee's authorized acts, so far as the parties are concerned,
are the same as those which would attach to an agent's authorized transactions
for his principal.8 0 In either view, it seems quite evident that in order to give
"Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. (1934), 32 P. 2d 672.
"5Mont. Rev. Code, 1935, sec. 7914; see, also, N. D. Comp. L. 1913, see. 6305; S. D. Code, 1939,
see. 59.0209.
"See Calif. Civ. Code, sec. 2343.
"Rest., Agency, sees. 144, 146, 156, 320, 328.
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reasonable effect to the statute, we must hold . . . that the trustee is not
personally liable but that the remedy is an action against it as trustee
(emphasis mine-R. T.), and that a judgment against it in that capacity is
limited in its application to the trust estate." 3 '
Returning to the problem heretofore raised, whether by virtue of sec-
tion 2267 in California, the trustee is free from personal liability on a
contract entered into in the administration of the trust, in the absence of
stipulations in the contract exempting him from personal liability, it is
submitted that the cases cited in support of the comment in the California
Annotations, Restatement of Trusts, are not conclusive. For example, in
People v. Sischo (1939), 31 Cal. App. 2d 345, an action brought to collect
tax delinquencies from defendants, a trust estate, and against the trustees
individually and as trustees, the lower court sustained the demurrer insofar
as the defendants were individually named, reversed on appeal, the upper
court citing the Goldwater case, supra, as a leading California case holding
trustees personally liable where the contract fails to stipulate the exemption,
and applying the Goldwater decision to tax delinquencies. But, as already
pointed out, the Goldwater case does obliquely recognize that there may
be an implied agreement with creditors to exclude the trustees from personal
liability. Could it not be argued that section 2267 is embodied in all con-
tracts made by trustees with third persons in the proper administration of
the trust? The Tuttle case, supra, construing an identical statute, does appar-
ently apply agency law. If the California decisions do not, the alternative
interpretation remains that the statutory remedy is not a destruction of the
common law rule, but simply an enlargement of the equitable relief secured
by a representative suit. (See 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, p. 2108.)
IV. Trust Liability
What remedies has the contract creditor when he cannot proceed against
the trustees personally? He must necessarily depend upon such liability
as might lawfully be created against the estate. The weight of authority
prevented the creditor from reaching the trust estate in an action at law.
Although in code states the procedural difficulties in permitting an action at
law against a trustee in his representative capacity are removed, the substan-
tive problem still remains whether, and to what extent, a contract creditor
should be permitted to obtain satisfaction out of the trust estate. The writers
on this subject are unanimous in their criticism of the common law authority
"The court also based its decision on the fact that the difficulties in the common law doctrine,
originating in procedural complications resulting from the diversity of legal and equitable remedies
and the failure to recognize the multiple legal personality of the trustee, are eliminated by the
joining of law and equity under the codes.
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which prevented a direct right against the trust property, and allowed only
a derivative right through a suit in equity. 2 Dean Stone's comment is typical:
"There is today no other situation where one may assume to carry on
any type of economic enterprise without imposing on the capital embarked
in it the cost of compensating for its expense or for the tortious acts com-
mitted by those who are engaged in carrying it on."
The courts of equity did attempt to assist deserving creditors, where the
trust estate was benefited and the remedy against the trustee personally was
either excluded or inadequate. They did so, recognizing that a suit against
the trustee in his representative capacity33 was not necessarily dependent on
the juristic personality of the trustee. However, the courts were not agreed
as to the theory or theories which would justify a recovery out of the trust
estate, or as to the circumstances under which, or the extent to which, such
recovery might be had.
The theories on which courts attempted to reach the trust property were:
(1) the theory of subrogation; (2) the "conferred benefit" theory, and (3)
the "binding contract" theory. The latter theory has been largely dealt
with in the preceding remarks. Where the third party is to look only to the
trust estate either because of the terms of the trust instrument or of stipula-
tions in the contract, a suit in equity was maintainable against the trustee in
his representative capacity, and it was immaterial whether the trustee was
solvent or not, since he was not personally liable. According to one theory,
the "power to charge" theory, such a contract gives the creditor a direct
claim against the trust estate, and if the liability is properly incurred by the
trustee, the creditor can reach the trust property whether or not the trustee
was in default to the estate on other matters. This is the theory of the Purdy
case, supra, where, although the trustee had misappropriated the money, it
was held the lender could recover against the trust estate.
However, under another view, the contract does not give the third
person a direct claim, but merely exempts the trustee's individual property
from liability. Under this theory, the creditor can reach the trust property
only to the extent that the trustee is entitled to exoneration, so that if the
trustee is in default to the trust, the contracting party is precluded from
reaching the trust property to the extent of such default.3 4
The terms "right of reimbursement" and "right of exoneration" are
used to describe rights of the trustee against the trust estate, arising out of
his administration of the property. The trustee is said to have a "lien" or
3218 Cornell L. Q. 134; 28 Harv. L. Rev. 725; 22 Columb. L. Rev. 527; 27 Cal. L. Rev. 432.
3 This is a misnomer actually, since no separate legal personality exists to be "represented."
"4Scott, Trusts, pp. 1524-25.
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"right of reimbursement" on both the income and the corpus of the estate
to secure his claims, and also a "right of exoneration," i. e., a right not to
be compelled to discharge liabilities out of his individual property. These
terms are inaccurate, in that it is difficult to speak of a "right" without a
corresponding duty on the part of some other person or persons (assuming
the cestui que is not personally liable), or of a "lien" upon property legally
owned by the lienor. Nevertheless, the courts have used these terms to
describe assets of the trustee to which a contract creditor may be subrogated
in equity, to compel the application of such assets to his claim against the
trustee. This is the subrogation theory of recovery, or more accurately, of
equitable execution.
This theory was invoked because it recognized that ultimately, the
liability for contracts made by the trustee in the proper administration of
the trust should be borne by the trust estate. The tendency today is to regard
the trustee as not the owner of the trust property despite his legal title thereto,
but simply its administrator, even where the rights of persons other than the
beneficiaries are concerned.34(a) Aside from compensation for services, the
trustee does not benefit personally from its administration. Any benefits
from his contracts with third persons ultimately go to the beneficiaries of the
trust. It is logical and equitable, therefore, to impose on the trust estate those
economic burdens which are incidental to its proper administration. 4 b The
statement "the trust estate is liable" might be open to the objection that the
courts engage in a metaphysical personification of the estate-whereas legal
relations are supposed to exist only between persons, and not between persons
and things. However, the statement is purely figurative, and the fiction is
maintained solely for its convenience in the effective administration of
justice. All that is intended by the expression is that the contract creditor
can maintain a suit in equity against the trustee to compel him to apply the
trust property to the discharge of liabilities arising under the contract. In
other words, the third person can maintain a suit in equity against the trustee
in his representative capacity.
In most jurisdictions, a bill by the creditor would be allowed only upon
a showing that relief against the trustee personally was impossible, for such
reasons as insolvency, beyond the jurisdiction, etc. Some cases required a
judgment be first obtained against the trustee and execution returned nulla
bona, but because equity should not compel the creditor to do a useless thing,
most decisions permit equitable execution without the circuitous method
8 (')Scott, Trusts, see. 261.
"Mtb)3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, see. 718. -
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mentioned. 5 Massachusetts courts permit a bill in equity without proof of
trustee's insolvency, because the exhaustion of legal remedies is not a con-
dition precedent to equitable execution.
But one difficulty with the derivative theory of subrogation is that where
it is followed the creditor may fail because the trustee has no right of
indemnity. Assuming a situation where the trustee has contracted against
personal liability and there is no statute permitting an action against the trust
estate, or the creation of a lien, the creditor would be remediless where the
trustee is in default to the trust estate in an entirely independent matter for
an amount equal to or exceeding the amount of the creditor's claim. A further
difficulty is the cumbersome method of an accounting to determine whether
or not the trustee has a right of exoneration from the trust estate.
It was because of this greater privilege of the trustee that the former
Dean Stone was led to renounce the reimbursement theory of recovery in
favor of the more direct "power to charge" theory, 6 which allows the trust
estate to be expressly obligated by the trustee's contract. The trustee who is
unwilling or unable to incur personal liability is here permitted to create
a charge equivalent to his own lien for reimbursement, in favor of third
persons who render services or otherwise give value to the trust.
The explanatory comment in Restatement, Trusts, section 271, indicates
that although it is an equitable remedy it has eliminated some of the objec-
tionable features of the usual derivative remedy."7 The remedy is available
whether or not there is a provision in the trust agreement permitting an
exclusion of personal liability clause in the contract, and it is also available
where the trustee may be in default and not entitled to indemnity. The
remedy is limited to cases where the contract was made in the proper adminis-
tration of the trust, but it is not defeated even where no benefit was conferred
upon the estate.
"Where a person, not acting officiously or gratuitously, has conferred
a benefit upon the trust estate, he can, by a proceeding in equity, reach the
"Prof. Scott, in his article, "Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts," 28 Harv. L.
Rev. 725 (1915), distinguishes between the right of exoneration and the right of reimbursement.
He indicates that equitable enforcement of the obligation under the former can be sought only by
the trust creditors, not by the trustee's private creditors; while on the other hand, where the trustee
has paid the trust creditor out of his private assets, the right of reimbursement can be reached by
trustee's private creditors.
"See Rest., Trusts, sec. 271; Jessup v. Smith, 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403; Cullinan v. Mercan-
tile Trust Co., supra; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 715.
'"Prof. Scott's article, supra, indicates that the "power to charge" theory is derived from the
trustee's right of exoneration. But cf. Dean Stone's article, where it is pointed out that since no
personal judgment can be taken against the trustee, because of the stipulation that he shall not
be personally liable, it is difficult to see what "right" of exoneration there can be. This action by
courts of equity in compelling the exercise of trustee's power is a clear recognition that the power
does not exist for the benefit of the trustee alone. In this regard, see Gilbert v. Penfield (1899), 124
Cal. 244, 56 P. 1107.
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trust property and apply it to the satisfaction of his claim to the extent to
which the trust estate was benefited." 38
This is the expression of the "conferred benefit" theory. The relief
given under it is based on the general principle that one person shall not be
unjustly enriched at another's expense. The contract creditor is here not
precluded from obtaining satisfaction out of the trust estate by the fact that
the trustee is not entitled to indemnity. The right is direct, not derivative.
It is available although the trustee has exceeded his authority in incurring
the liability. California is in accord.39 However, this direct right is not
recognized in all jurisdictions. In a few cases, recovery has been allowed
by a direct right based on the prevention of unjust enrichment, but mainly
on grounds of social policy, without the support of any adequate analysis
of the relation of the parties on which a right on behalf of the creditor could
be based."0
V. Conclusion
The modern tendency is to make the trust estate responsible for contracts
properly made by the trustee. The procedural difficulties have been largely
removed by joinder of law and equity, and by statute. The substantive diffi-
culties tend to disappear in the recognition of the trustee as a juristic person
to whom direct attachment of liabilities is applied. This is largely a ques-
tion of public policy, which depends as much on the method of historical
jurisprudence as on the method of analytic jurisprudence, in the reasonable
distribution of liabilities and rights of the parties involved. It is possible
that much of the rationale for shifting liability to the trust estate was due
to cases of insolvency of trustees. Today, the solvency of trustees is more
or less guaranteed by the very nature of the modern trustee, often a large
trust company or a trust department of a bank. In the event of their insol-
vency, the trust estate would likewise be much reduced in value, if not com-
pletely exhausted. The policy of casting the economic burden resulting from
a breach of the trustee's contract with third persons onto the trust estate
rather than onto the creditor, by sanctioning a resort to the estate, is in line
with the policy of the law in other legal relationships, that an economic
enterprise should bear its own burdens. Perhaps, under varying conditions
of trust administration, the tendency may shift back, or even reach beyond,
to the beneficiaries.
"8 Scott, Trusts, sec. 269.
"Irvine v. MacGregor (1927), 203 Cal. 583, 265 P. 218.
"Miller v. Smythe (Ga., 1893), 92 Ga. 154, 18 S. E. 46. A covenant in a lease of the trust
property was breached by the trustee lessor, who neglected to make necessary repairs, with
consequent injury to plaintiff lessee. Plaintiff was allowed to recover in a suit brought against
trustee in his representative capacity. Legal remedy was not exhausted.
